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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY & GOVERNMENT 
President Yel'tsin sacks government 
On 23 March, President Yel'tsin announced the dismissal of his entire 
government, including the prime minister. While most analysts, in and out of 
Russia, reacted with shock and surprise, it now is clear that President Yel'tsin's 
move was neither as comprehensive nor as spontaneous as it may have first 
appeared. 
 
In addition to the decree requiring the resignation of the government, specific 
individuals were targeted, via separate decrees, for dismissal. PM Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, First Deputy Anatoli Chubais and Interior Minister Anatoli Kulikov 
were all singled out. In subsequent interviews, Chubais has made clear that he 
submitted his resignation some time ago and that Monday's presidential 
announcement was no surprise. Kulikov has yet to comment, but his first deputy, 
Col. Gen. Pavel Maslov, who is now acting MVD chief, claims to have learned of 
his appointment only through media reports. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Mar 98; NEXIS) 
Kulikov's removal cannot be viewed as a wholly unexpected development 
however, given the diminution of his authority in the January restructuring of 
governmental responsibilities. (Obshchaya gazeta, 22 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
023) 
 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's dismissal, which was claimed to require the more 
sensational dissolution of the cabinet, initially appeared the most perplexing. Why 
would the president disassociate himself from a loyal ally, who, over his five 
years as PM, has demonstrated himself to be a cautious politician, capable of 
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balancing and placating such disparate forces as the security agencies, the 
Communist opposition and the young reformers? Perhaps because the very 
qualities that have made Chernomyrdin a valuable asset in the past have 
recently been exposed as potentially serious liabilities to the president, his 
government, and particularly his apparat. 
 
There are persistent media allegations that an influential group of advisers to the 
president engineered the ouster of Chernomyrdin. Some appear remarkably 
prescient: In an article in Obshchaya gazeta (29 Jan - 4 Feb 98), a 
correspondent cites a confidential source: "The President will remove both of 
them--both Chubais and Chernomyrdin. Keep in mind: The Family is displeased 
with Chernomyrdin." 
 
"The Family," is used to refer not only to the Yel'tsin family influences on the 
president (and there is often the danger of overstating the policy impact of 
Dyachenko and others), but also the close friends and advisers, such as Valentin 
Yumashev and, possibly, Boris Berezovsky. Certainly Berezovsky's comments in 
an interview on the eve of the president's announcement suggest he had at least 
prior knowledge, if not input. 
 
Whether there exists a Kremlin coterie which plotted against the prime minister, 
Chernomyrdin's actions of late have demonstrated none of his usual political 
savvy. His redistribution of governmental responsibilities in January, for example, 
certainly damaged what once appeared to be a strong alliance with Interior 
Minister Kulikov. As noted above, Chernomyrdin reduced Kulikov's sphere of 
oversight and declared his own personal supervision of the security organs. 
While the reasons for this shift remain unclear, Chernomyrdin certainly chose an 
inopportune time to alienate a powerful ally. 
 
In what was a particularly egregious mistake however, Chernomyrdin himself 
turned his critical role as liaison with the parliament into a threat to presidential 
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authority. At a meeting of the "Big Four" (Yel'tsin, Chernomyrdin, Stroev and 
Seleznev) in late January, Chernomyrdin apparently supported a plan devised by 
Communist Duma leader Gennadi Seleznev for the creation of a coalition 
government. Reports on the details of the plan suggested that a government 
would be formed comprising three Communist members, three members from 
Chernomyrdin's NDR, and two from each of the remaining parties. (Moskovsky 
komsomolets, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-029) 
 
Yel'tsin's reaction to the plan, which would have curtailed his appointment 
authority over government members, overturned the dominance of reformers and 
likely halted economic and privatization reform plans, was, unsurprisingly, 
negative. (Interfax, 9 Jan 98) There are no reports that the "Big Four" has since 
been convened. 
 
By the end of January, therefore, Chernomyrdin had already damaged his 
alliance with Kulikov, overplayed his importance in parliamentary relations and 
simultaneously brought his loyalty to the president into question. If this did not 
provide sufficient grounds for dismissal, his overt campaigning for the year 2000 
presidential elections was unseemly at best, if not disrespectful of an unwell, yet 
still powerful Yel'tsin. 
 
While the president's dismissal of the government initially appeared both 
shocking and rash, the move may substantially bolster both Yel'tsin's authority 
and the economic reforms. The appointment of Boris Nemtsov's protege, Sergei 
Kiriyenko, as acting prime minister proved a buoyant trial balloon: On 27 March, 
after only minor negative parliamentary reaction to Kiriyenko, Yel'tsin named him 
as Chernomyrdin's successor and dared the parliament to reject his nomination. 
(AP News Online, 27 Mar 98) Threatening the Duma with dissolution if it rejected 
Kiriyenko's candidacy three times, Yel'tsin said, "Do not make a spiral of 
confrontation. I won't have any indulgence in it. And this is useless." (ITAR-
TASS, 27 Mar 98; NEXIS) 
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Duma Speaker Seleznev has already signaled a reluctant willingness to confirm 
Kiriyenko and avoid the dismissal of the parliament. (ITAR-TASS, 27 Mar 98; 
NEXIS) 
 
For a man often viewed as too ill or erratic to rule, President Yel'tsin comes 
through this once again, looking crazy like a fox. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough 
 
Primakov: Kosovo events are Yugoslavia's problem 
The events in Kosovo, a volatile area of Serbia predominantly populated by 
ethnic Albanians, is Yugoslavia's internal problem which has no direct bearing on 
the settlement process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov said at a news conference in Moscow on 4 March. (Interfax, 1435 
GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) Two weeks later, while in Belgrade, 
Primakov reinforced this point of view, stating that "two principles should be 
observed in settling disputes regarding national minorities: territorial integrity, i.e., 
resolving issues within one state, and giving wide-scale rights in self-governing, 
which meet the interests of this minority." Noting Russian relations with 
Chechnya he said, "We exercise this approach in resolving conflicts on the 
territory of the former USSR." (Interfax, 1417 GMT, 17 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
076) 
 
Primakov's statements on the Kosovo situation, however, should in no way be 
seen as a reversal of foreign policy. 
 
Citing the Russia-NATO act and the Russian role in the recent Iraqi crisis as 
recent foreign policy successes, Primakov said Russia "acts as a world power, a 
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world player in the world arena." On 6 March he told young diplomats who joined 
the ministry in 1997 that "the role of a world power is not an aim in itself, but a 
thought-out role for Russia in conditions of a difficult and zigzag-style transition to 
a multipolar world." (Interfax, 1651 GMT, 6 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-065) 
 
Russia angles for international position 
Russia has requested that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appoint a Russian 
representative as a deputy head of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, or 
UNSCOM. Russia made the proposal in order to make UNSCOM's work more 
effective and to ensure a more just "geographic representation" of countries on 
the commission, a Russian spokesman said. The commission currently includes 
specialists from 21 countries; UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, from Australia, 
currently has only one deputy, a US citizen. (Interfax, 1213 GMT, 6 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-065) 
 
Broader ties with Iran... but no weapons of mass destruction 
Following his one-on-one talks with his Iranian counterpart Kamal Kharrazi, 
Primakov said that he favors "the continuation of the long-established practice of 
bilateral cooperation" between Russia and Iran. He had stated before enlarged 
talks with Kharrazi that "the two neighboring states are interested in good-
neighborly relations and try to broaden them in all areas and not only for the sake 
of mutual advantage." (Interfax, 1044 GMT, 25 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-056) 
 
At the same time the foreign ministers "deny as absolutely groundless various 
claims of alleged cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in developing 
weapons of mass destruction in Iran." A separate report reinforced this stance as 
"the sides reaffirmed their unchanging loyalty to the principles of the UN charter 
and their international commitments and favored the continuation of cooperation 
in the peaceful use of nuclear energy under effective IAEA control." (Interfax, 
0922 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-TAC-98-058) However, perhaps in an attempt to 
silence international attention on the nuclear project, Moscow stated that Russia 
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will not sign any new documents with Iran until it has completed the contract to 
build the nuclear power station at Bushehr. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1228 
GMT, 6 Mar 98; FBIS-TAC-98-065) The ministers' statements evade the real 
issue: Russian transfer of missile technology to Iran. 
 
Russia prepared to mediate India-Pakistan agreement 
Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin was received by 
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and met with Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub 
Khan during a two-day working visit to Islamabad. The Russian envoy stated that 
Russia and Pakistan must engage in vigorous joint efforts to overcome the 
stereotypes of ideological confrontation of the "cold war" era and start a stable 
and progressive development of mutually beneficial relations in all areas. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 2018 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) Karasin also 
stated that better Pakistan ties will not harm existing Russian-Indian ties. 
(Interfax, 1204 GMT, 5 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-064) 
 
Finally, in keeping with Primakov's desire to play a leading role in Mideast and 
Asian affairs, Kasarin said if both countries show interest in its assistance, 
Russia is prepared to help normalize relations between India and Pakistan. 
Karasin told ITAR-TASS that Moscow's mediatory role had been discussed 
during his visit to Islamabad in the beginning of March. (ITAR-TASS, 1519 GMT, 
11 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-070) 
 
Primakov on OSCE 
"The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe must play a greater 
role in the formation of a system of European security in this connection it is 
necessary to intensify work on the Charter of European security," Primakov 
stated on 3 March. He also expressed a view that "a system built on the basis of 
different organizations must not be hierarchic." Moreover, he said, "at the same 
time the OSCE differs from other organizations by its composition and 
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multifunction activities, and therefore it must, and can play a system-forming 
role." (ITAR-TASS, 2124 GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) 
 
Comment 
Although Primakov also stressed the valuable role the OSCE is playing in 
Belarus and Azerbaijan, the idea of the OSCE playing the lead role in European 
security has become a continual theme for the foreign minister, especially as the 
possibility of further NATO expansion remains. 
 
Russia excluded from Caspian conference 
Russia has officially expressed its "legitimate bewilderment" over the list of 
countries whose foreign ministers took part in a conference on the Caspian Sea 
in Istanbul 1-2 March, foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov told a 
briefing in Moscow on 3 March. The conference, which focused in part on the 
project to build a Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, involved the foreign ministers of 
Turkey, which organized the meeting, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. "Regardless of the make-up of one or another meeting, nobody 
can undo the fact that Russia is one of the countries surrounding the Caspian 
Sea," he said. (Interfax, 1342 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-062) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Lt. Col. Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
ELECTIONS 
Ex-minister Rodionov and others register as candidates for Duma seat 
Former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov has been registered as a candidate for 
district number 197 in Moscow--Orekhovo-Borisovo. Other registered candidates 
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include the former deputy of the Moscow City Duma, Anatoli Stankov, Chairman 
of the Conservative Party Lev Ubozhko, and the leader of the Officers' Union, 
Stanislav Terekhov. Fourteen other hopefuls are tendering their applications as 
well. It seems that the Duma--at least from this district--is becoming a chamber of 
ex-political officials looking for a title, an income, or perhaps parliamentary 
immunity (Interfax, 0920 GMT, 16 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-047). 
 
The next day, General Andrei Nikolaev, the former Federal Border Service 
commander, also registered as a candidate for the same seat. The residents of 
Orekhovo-Borisovo grimly joke that the military is assembling in order to take 
over eventually. Let us hope that the voters choose wisely (NTV, 1100 GMT, 17 
Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-048). 
 
Lebed interviewed on his plans if elected governor of Krasnoyarsk 
Denying that the present run for governor is in fact a move toward the 
presidency--or a seat in the Federation Council--General Aleksandr Lebed claims 
that his true interest is only in serving the people of Krasnoyarsk region (NTV, 
1100 GMT, 17 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-048). 
 
Yet considering Lebed's national standing and his past popularity, one might 
assume that he is a "shoo-in." However, a public opinion poll shows that the 
region's incumbent, Valeri Zubov, has more than a 2:1 lead over Lebed. This 
speaks to the power of the incumbency, the importance of local issues and 
personalities, or that Lebed has lost some of his appeal. It is perhaps too early to 
judge whether Lebed can make a successful bid for the presidency, but defeat 
would certainly not help the case he would need to make to the nation (ITAR-
TASS, 0632 GMT, 26 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-057). 
 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Duma Chairman Seleznev calls for amendments to the constitution 
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"If we do not amend the constitution, we risk ruining the Russian Federation, 
because there are very serious contradictions which must be resolved... by 
means of convoking a constitutional assembly," according to the Duma chairman, 
Gennadi Seleznev. High on Seleznev's list is the need for clarifying division of 
power between the center and the regions. But most importantly, the relationship 
between an overly powerful executive branch and a much weaker legislative 
branch needs to be re-ordered in favor of the Duma. Seleznev claims that the 
present constitution was drafted and ratified too quickly and that this is the 
reason for the basic law's problems. 
 
The chairman is undoubtedly correct, but not only has the amendment process 
yet to be defined, it is not clear whether the Federal Assembly is presently 
capable of meeting greater responsibilities. Before power relationships can be 
addressed, the question of Duma elections needs to be resolved (Interfax, 1533 
GMT, 14 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-045). 
 
Federation Council to hold 'government hour' 
Just as in the Duma, members of the government will be invited to answer 
questions from members of parliament's upper chamber. Oleg Sysuev and Yakov 
Urinson, deputy prime ministers of the government, and Emergencies Minister 
Sergei Shoigu, are expected to take part in the first such government hour. 
Governmental accountability is certainly a good thing; with luck, this will help to 
encourage the concept (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1612 GMT, 17 Feb 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-048). 
 
Duma appoints new CIS Committee chair 
The lower house of parliament removed Sergei Baburin (People's Power) from 
his post as chair of the CIS Committee. Deputy speaker Svetlana Goryacheva 
(Communist Party) was appointed to the post. Baburin has been harshly critical 
of the Communists, a move which, according to Gennadi Zyuganov, is in 
violation of cooperation agreements between the two parties. This has 
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exacerbated the division within the People's Power into pro-Baburin and pro-
Ryzhkov blocs. 
 
The existence of the People's Power (Narodovlastiye) faction is the result of an 
uneasy alliance between Baburin and Ryzhkov, validated by Communist Party 
recognition of its status as a parliamentary faction. The original quid pro quo was 
that the People's Power unit would provide unflagging support for the 
Communists in exchange for committee chairmanships. With Baburin's removal, 
this agreement, indeed the very existence of the People's Power faction, is 
brought into question. (ITAR-TASS, 1608 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Urinson and Chubais outline the defense industry's prospects 
During an expanded session of the Russian government, a new program for 
modernizing the defense industry was revealed. This program is a joint product 
of the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Defense and outlines the 
restructuring and conversion of the defense industry in 1998-2000 and until 2005. 
Urinson stressed that "organizational, financial, and economic mechanisms ... will 
enable defense production to be concentrated at ... most effective enterprises." 
Chubais said that the current 1,749 defense enterprises would be trimmed to 
650-670 by the year 2000. Urinson noted that, to begin implementation, a six-
month period to repay debt and restructure finances would be necessary. If the 
debts were considered "good" (due to nonpayment by the state), then they would 
be repaid this year. The total amount of debt accumulated for the 1997 state 
order is estimated at around 10 billion new rubles (Moskovsky Komsomolets, 17 
Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-061, and ITAR-TASS, 1032 GMT, 26 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-057). 
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As example of the crippling effect this debt has had on defense industry reform, 
Sverdlovsk Region Governor Eduard Rossel met with Chubais and described the 
situation there. Over 40 enterprises of the military/industrial Sverdlovsk complex 
are on the verge of striking. The defense ministry's and the atomic energy 
ministry's debt totals over 1 billion "new" rubles; wages in arrears account for 
R200 million of this amount (ITAR-TASS, 1112 GMT, 2 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
061). Similarily, the federal debt to Russia's Zabaykalsky military district is also 
over 1 billion redenominated rubles with R105 million associated with salaries. 
Military installations are beginning to feel the backlash directly, as energy 
workers switch off heat and electricity in military installations. (ITAR-TASS, 0707 
GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) 
 
Russia seeks new markets as arms exports continue to decline 
Announcing a 26 percent drop in Russian arms exports from 1996 to 1997, 
Russian Foreign Trade Minister Mikhail Fradkov identified financial troubles in 
many customers' economies as the culprit. His solution to this is to expand 
Russia's market base by finding both new partners and new market niches. He 
attempted to put a positive spin on the decline by saying that "efforts to improve 
the structure of settlements ... were successful," claiming that 75 percent of 1997 
arm export payments were made in convertible currency. He specifically targeted 
Latin American, Asian, Pacific and African markets as objectives for increased 
arms exports in 1998. Russia currently engages in military cooperation with 64 
countries and projects signing agreements with 13 additional. (Interfax, 1554 
GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) 
 
In spite of Fradkov's claims concerning movement towards a stronger cash basis, 
Russian armaments continue to be delivered in repayment of debt. Seoul took 
delivery of a regular shipment of goods to service a debt that has grown to $1.47 
billion. A cargo ship delivered 10 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and tank 
ammunition worth over $30 million. Seoul has agreed to partial repayment of the 
debt by taking deliveries of 33 BMP-3s, 33 T-80U tanks, and portable anti-tank 
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missile systems designated Igla valued at $210 million. Delivery of raw mineral 
materials will total another $210 million. (ITAR-TASS, 0733 GMT, 11 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-070) 
 
In keeping with Russia's need for capital, Interfax reported, military and 
diplomatic sources have threatened that Russia may revise its promise not to 
conclude new arms export contracts with Iran, especially if the US uses force 
against Iraq. One source was quoted as describing Iran as "a solvent country" 
which "pays for arms supplies with cash and oil." Iranian interest include 
offensive helicopters and high-speed ships equipped with antiship missiles. 
(Interfax, 1247 GMT, 25 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-056) 
 
Russia struggles to push privatization of the defense industry and to find 
marketable, competitive commercial products to support defense conversion. 
The debt owed the defense enterprises continues to accumulate and cash from 
arms exports is apparently a trickle, considering offsets and debt repayments. 
The result is little overall capital to support the defense industry reforms. Recent 
agreements such as the An-70 transport aircaft production program between 
Russia and Ukraine are hopeful, but it remains to be seen if the required 
investment, estimated at $150-200 million, can be obtained. This is the sort of 
dual-use conversion that has hope for success, more so, considering the 
potential that the An-70 may be able to serve as the basis for a joint European 
military and cargo aircraft. The old adage is true: "It takes money to make 
money." Until the debts are repaid and cash is flowing into the state coffers as 
well as the defense enterprises, there will be little long-term success. And as far 
as Chubais' and Urinson's commitment to "find" the 10 trillion rubles to clear the 
debt in six months--the lights are still going out on military installations and 
officers' salaries are paying for operational capability. 
 
Yel'tsin asks for parity 
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President Yel'tsin has tasked the new atomic energy minister, Yevgeni Adamov, 
with ensuring international parity in nuclear technology including weapons "so 
that the parity is maintained, while resources necessary for securing it can be 
reduced." Yel'tsin described nuclear power engineering as a very subtle and 
dangerous industry, noting that "both diplomacy and weapons" were present. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 0949 GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) 
 
In other weapons news, Moscow and Kyiv are discussing the sale of 19 TU-160 
and 21 TU-95MS strategic bombers. Ukrainian military officials have privately 
reported that Ukraine is unable to maintain the aircraft because the necessary 
technical documentation remains in Russia. Russian officials have stated that 
two-thirds of the aircraft have lost their combat capability. (Interfax, 0907 GMT, 
26 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-057) 
 
Russia to build floating nuclear power plants 
Plans are well advanced to begin construction next year at the Baltiisky Shipyard 
near St. Petersburg for a floating nuclear power plant. The first plant is scheduled 
to go the Siberian mining town of Pevek in 2003. The plan calls for the plant to be 
built on a 126-meter pontoon. The plant would consist of two type KLT-40C 
reactors, the same type used on Russian nuclear powered ice-breakers and the 
Kirov class battlecruisers. (St. Petersburg Times Weekly Internet Edition, 9-15 
Mar 98) 
 
Elsewhere, the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran, India and China is a 
priority for the atomic energy ministry. Current international projects are valued at 
over $5 billion. Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeni Adamov is expected to sign 
contracts worth $2.5 billion with India next month for two VVER-1000 pressurized 
water reactors. The Russian nuclear construction industry is currently operating 
below capacity. (Interfax, 1505 GMT, 17 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-076) 
 
Comment  
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The VVER-1000 is a third-generation Russian pressurized-water reactor plant. 
Although the plant attempts to incorporate Western-style safety features, the 
design falls well short of Western standards. For general information on this and 
other Russian civilian nuclear plants, see Argonne National Laboratory's 
International Nuclear Safety Center at http://www.insc.anl.gov. 
 
Military urges deserters to return; those who remain face hazing, threats 
Moscow military authorities have launched their second special operation of the 
year to round up military deserters. The operation, called "Deserter, Give 
Yourself Up," promises clemency to deserters who surrender themselves. Many 
of the deserters have left the services due to the climate of hazing and brutality 
found throughout the military. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 6 Mar 98) 
 
One danger facing recruits is death. A junior officer has been sentenced to seven 
years of hard labor for the beating death of a teenaged recruit. The military court 
found Lieutenant Valery Mantulenko guilty of savagely beating a 19-year-old 
soldier to death and "overstepping his authority." (Agence France-Presse, 0005 
PST, 4 Mar 98; C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev warned that discipline has broken down to such 
an extent that the military could fall prey to organized crime. "There is the very 
real threat of organized crime breaking through into the ranks of the military (...) 
Today the problem of law and order in the armed forces has assumed a 
nationwide scope," he was quoted as saying. The defense minister was speaking 
to a special session of the military leadership devoted to the problems of 
discipline in the armed forces. (Agence France-Presse, 0400 PST, 10 Mar 98; C-
afp@clari.net) 
 
Additionally, staff exercises being held by the North Caucasus Military District 
were disrupted when utilities to the headquarters of the 8th Army Corps in 
Volgograd were cut off for non-payment of electric, water and heating bills. The 
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payment arrears for the unit's sauna alone are 2.5 million new rubles. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 0853 GMT, 17 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-076) 
 
Hero Arrested 
In an example of the plight facing many retired Russians, a World War II veteran 
and recipient of the Soviet Union's highest award, "Hero of the Soviet Union," 
was arrested for selling drugs near the infamous Lubyanka Prison. The arrested 
pensioner admitted to selling drugs and said he did so to supplement his income. 
(Agence France-Presse, 0253 PST, 4 Mar 98; C-afp@clari.net) 
 
HISTORY NOTE 
Soviet Union sought navy base from Portugal in 1975 
A Portuguese daily, Diario De Noticias, reported the Soviet Union asked 
Portugal's Communist government in 1975 for permission to build a naval base 
on the Atlantic island of Madeira. The base was to be used as a refueling facility 
for Soviet naval and merchant ships. Although the request was first reported on 
the island of Madeira in 1975, no mainland paper picked up the story since 
mainland Portugal was still preoccupied from a failed coup attempt. (Agence 
France-Presse, 1025 PST, 11 Mar 98; C-afp@clari.net) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Heads of State summit postponed 
Due to President Yel'tsin's poor health, the Heads of State meeting scheduled for 
19 March was canceled. This marks the second summit in as many months to be 
canceled at Yel'tsin's behest, again pointing up the fact that the president and 
other Russian officials are the only decision makers who matter in the CIS. Both 
Presidents Shevardnadze and Aliev threatened not to attend the Moscow summit 
because they feared for their own safety. Both have been victims of 
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assassination attempts committed by criminals who were later harbored in 
Russia. The threats of these two presidents, however, were not enough to force 
a cancellation. 
 
The postponement did not affect the usual pre-summit meetings of the 
subordinate councils. The CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA) convened on 
28 February despite the absence of the Ukrainian, Turkmen, and Uzbek 
representatives. The main result of the meeting was the re-election of Russian 
Federation Council chairman Yegor Stroev as chairman of the IPA. Despite CIS 
resolutions requiring rotation of key CIS posts among member states, no non-
Russian has ever held the chairmanship (Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vladimir 
Shumeiko were Stroev's predecessors). Of the subjects discussed, Stroev 
singled out the strengthening of cooperation between the IPA and CIS statutory 
bodies and said that the IPA agreed on the need to move from model laws to 
laws which would apply to the CIS as a whole. Stroev continues with his desire to 
re-integrate the NIS through these types of laws, which he insists must "pertain to 
regulating economic integration, creating a basis for unified interstate structures, 
and resolving social issues" (ITAR-TASS, 1105 GMT, 28 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
060). 
 
The CIS foreign ministers held a meeting on 4-5 March which, apparently for the 
first time, was also attended by representatives from the Council of Defense 
Ministers, other power structures and law enforcement agencies. The ministers 
discussed security issues, organized crime, military cooperation, and 
peacekeeping operations (ITAR-TASS, 1701 GMT, 5 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
064). The attendance of other "power organs" heads indicates that Russian 
Foreign Minister Primakov has been somewhat successful in linking Russian 
foreign policy to CIS military, security, and crime policy. Perhaps soon when 
Primakov speaks, he will do so on behalf of the commonwealth's power 
committees. 
 
 17 
The CIS Council of Heads of Government held its meeting on 6 March and 
adopted eleven wide-ranging draft agreements. Conventions on transnational 
corporations, agreements on a common agrarian market, a treaty on the status of 
law enforcement officers of other CIS states, and a convention on criminal 
extradition were signed in addition to several economic agreements. One other 
major development was the signing, over Georgia's objection, of a plan for 
military cooperation through 2001. 
 
At the urging of Russian Minister for Cooperation with CIS Countries Anatoli 
Adamishin, the Heads of Government also agreed to form yet another CIS 
organization--the CIS Inter State Forum--which is to be a top level conference 
that within six months will prepare a plan and documents to implement urgent 
reforms of [CIS] bodies (ITAR-TASS, 1103 GMT, 6 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-065). 
The idea for the committee was first advanced during a meeting between 
Presidents Kuchma and Yel'tsin as a way of solving the commonwealth's 
problems (ITAR-TASS, 0856 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-058). Although the 
mission of the forum appears to be a complete revision of the commonwealth's 
founding documents and subsequent agreements, it is doubtful that any new and 
workable ideas can come of it. For the same reason that the CIS fails--the desire 
of sovereign states to pursue their own national interests--any new organization 
seems likewise doomed. The composition of the forum is also puzzling. The CIS 
already has councils of heads of state, government, parliament, foreign and 
interior ministers. What new role could the forum play that current councils do not 
already cover? This may end up as a case of reorganizing to give the 
appearance of progress. 
 
Kuchma and Yel'tsin support closer CIS cooperation 
As mentioned above, the Ukrainian and Russian presidents spoke of pursuing 
closer ties within the commonwealth. This announcement from Kuchma, the 
staunchest opponent of supra-national structures, was hailed by CIS Executive 
Secretary Ivan Korotchenya who immediately announced, "If Russia and Ukraine 
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have agreed on such an approach" to the commonwealth's development, "the 
rest have nothing to do but join in." (ITAR-TASS, 1922 GMT, 2 Mar 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-061) This does seem to be an about-face for Kuchma, but it may just be 
a small payback to Yel'tsin for his support in the upcoming Ukrainian presidential 
election. We will see if Kuchma's attitude has really changed if and when he is re-
elected. 
 
Serov out, Rybkin in as deputy premier 
Expressing their dissatisfaction with the level of cooperation with CIS countries, 
both President Yel'tsin and Premier Chernomyrdin announced that Valeri Serov, 
the Russian deputy premier for CIS affairs, was being replaced by Ivan Rybkin. 
The new deputy premier's last position in the Russian government was chief of 
the Security Council. He has also held posts in the USSR Community Party, the 
Russian Supreme Soviet (1991-1993), and the Duma (1993-1995). Rybkin was 
also in charge of Russian affairs in Chechnya (ITAR-TASS, 2058 GMT, 2 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-061, and NTV, 1600 GMT, 28 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-060). The 
move is seen as a way of backing up Yel'tsin's claim that 1998 is the "Year of the 
CIS" or, perhaps more accurately, the year of the re-integration of the CIS. 
Rybkin is seen as a man who can get things done and his appointment signals 
the ever-increasing priority the NIS has in Russia's policy hierarchy. 
 
Rumblings in the Duma 
Anyone who believes that the Russian Duma is interested in treating members of 
the NIS as independent, sovereign nations should take note of the following 
incident. While debating the ratification of the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and 
Cooperation Treaty (signed by the presidents and ratified by Ukraine), Georgiy 
Tikhonov, the head of the Duma's committee on CIS affairs, hurled four-letter 
words and insults at the Ukrainian lawmakers present. Tikhonov threatened to 
throw the leader of the Ukrainian delegation out of the room and tried to present 
him with a demand to hold referenda in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
simultaneously "on the unification of these countries into a single state." He also 
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said that Ukraine was not a real state and objected to the signing of the 
cooperation treaty because it would solidify national borders and accept the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Infobank, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-062). With 
Duma heads like this... 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tracy Gerstle 
 
MOLDOVA 
Moldovans go to the polls 
Moldova successfully held its parliamentary elections on Sunday, 22 March. 
International observers proclaimed the elections fair and over 67 percent of the 
electorate turned out to vote. 
 
Despite the predictions of many opinion polls over the past few weeks, it appears 
that the Communist Party will not control the new Moldovan parliament. Of the 
nine parties, six political blocs and 67 independent candidates registered for the 
elections, only four groups jumped the four percent electoral threshold to gain 
seats.(Interfax, 1657 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079) As expected, the Communist 
Party (CP) won the largest percentage of the vote and, therefore, the most seats 
in parliament at 30 percent and 41 seats, respectively. However, the three 
remaining parties--the Democratic Convention (19 percent and 26 seats), the 
Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (18 percent and 24 seats) 
and the Party of Democratic Forces (9 percent and 10 seats)--obtained enough 
seats among them to form a coalition government, with 60 seats, effectively 
overruling the CP. It remains to be seen if these three parties will be able to form 
a workable coalition, though they all have confirmed their "refusal" to form an 
alliance with the CP. (Jamestown Monitor, 24 Mar 98) 
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In related news, inhabitants of the Gagauz-Yeri autonomous region may have 
been surprised to find that their ballots did not contain a provision on a 
constitution for the region. As reported in the last issue of the digest, the region's 
assembly had voted to organize a referendum on a constitution simultaneously 
with Moldova's parliamentary elections. On 17 March, just five days before 
elections, the Supreme Court ruled against the assembly's vote. Shortly 
thereafter the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) canceled the referendum. Ion 
Busuleac, a CEC representative, said that some of the constitution's provisions 
were "contrary to Moldova's constitution," and that the Gagauz assembly had 
failed to harmonize the two documents in time for the vote. Mr. Busuleac added 
that the referendum was in violation of Moldovan law, since the constitution was 
only made available to the public 15 days before the elections and it was 
published in Russian. (Infotag, 1700 GMT, 17 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-076) 
 
Border squabbles between Moldova and Ukraine 
On 10 March, Moldovan Prime Minister Ion Ciubic protested Ukraine's decision to 
build fences around a site in the Danube estuary, effectively pushing the 
Moldovan border back 100 meters. After visiting the site, Mr. Ciubic said the 
action "ran contrary to international law." This fence prevents Moldova from 
accessing the Danube and an oil terminal it is building with aid from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (ITAR-TASS, 2151 GMT, 
10 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-070) The area is one of several in dispute during 
ongoing border talks between the two countries. 
 
Odessa talks fail to produce any real breakthroughs in the Dniestr conflict 
Any hopes that talks between Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi and Dniestr's 
leader Igor Smirnov, facilitated by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, might give a fresh impetus to the 
settlement of the Dniestr conflict were quickly dashed. The Moldovan and Dniestr 
leaders only succeeded in signing an agreement "on measures of trust and 
development of contacts between" the two sides. The meeting seemed more a 
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confirmation of the joint role that Ukraine and Russia intend to play in the 
breakaway region and Moldova. Indeed President Lucinschi thanked President 
Kuchma and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for their efforts as "guarantors of a 
settlement" in the conflict. (ITAR-TASS, 2131 GMT, 18 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
077) Following the meeting, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev confirmed 
that "Russia's military presence in the Dniestr region would last... [I]ts duration 
will depend upon progress in the conflict settlement." He "emphasized" all 
remaining Russian armaments in the region are in the possession of the Russian 
armed forces. (ITAR-TASS, 1253 GMT, 20 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079) 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine reneges on Bushehr turbine deal with Russia and Iraq 
After weeks of pressure from the United States and Russia and seemingly 
endless vacillation, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko announced 
the cancellation of a deal to supply Russia with turbines for a nuclear power plant 
it is building in Iran. Udovenko's statement followed a visit to Kyiv by US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at which the two sides signed a thirty-year 
nuclear cooperation agreement. A few days later, Ukraine's ambassador to the 
US, Yuri Shcherbak, stressed that his country's withdrawal from the Iranian deal 
should not be seen as a concession to the US. He said that Ukraine withdrew 
from the deal on economic grounds since it "opens wide possibilities for 
increased investments... by western countries... into Ukrainian nuclear power 
engineering." (ITAR-TASS, 0355 GMT, 13 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-072) 
Shcherbak hoped that Ukraine's reneging on its deal with Russia would not 
hinder "dynamically developing relations with Moscow." Both he and President 
Kuchma in a subsequent interview emphasized the importance of relations 
between Russia and Ukraine, especially in light of the status as each other's 
primary trading partners. 
 
Comment 
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This announcement comes in light of grumbles within both Ukraine and Russia 
as to Kyiv's orientation to the East and West. President Kuchma is walking a high 
wire delicately balancing relations between the two sides, with seemingly great 
success. On 1 March, an economic cooperation agreement between Ukraine and 
the European Union went into effect. (RFE/RL, 2 Mar 1998) It followed the ten-
year economic cooperation treaty that Kuchma signed with Russian President 
Boris Yel'tsin in late February, as well as Russia's cancellation of VAT on goods 
imported from Ukraine. However, Mr. Kuchma will have to watch his back, since 
both of these agreements have been greatly criticized within Ukraine as a sign of 
his overzealousness to make concessions. In the two weeks leading up to 
Ukraine's parliamentary elections on 29 March, he will have a tongue-lashing 
from Communist forces who see him as toadying to the West. 
 
BELARUS 
Belarusian ruble takes a nosedive 
On 13 March, the Belarusian ruble, known in Belarus as the zaichik, began to fall 
rapidly in value to the dollar, until it had lost 25 percent of its previous value. In 
the ensuing panic, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka immediately ordered his 
chief of staff, the national bank and the KGB to investigate the causes of the 
collapse and come up with measures to stabilize the market. Disregarding its 
own economic policies as an indicator as to the cause of the crisis, the 
government has blamed speculators, in the Russian Federation, for the drop. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1430 GMT, 18 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-077) 
 
As a response to the devaluation, the government has yet to implement any 
sound policies to shore up the zaichik, instead continuing its search for villains. 
On 18 March, fifty-eight high-ranking officials were arrested on charges of 
embezzlement and abuse of power. (Belapan, 1459 GMT, 18 Mar 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-077) At a 17 March news conference Lukashenka said he did not know 
how many more would be implicated, although he assured the press that "all 
those guilty will be imprisoned." Mr. Lukashenka felt confident that Belarus would 
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weather the crisis better than most countries, since even though the country did 
not "have sufficient amounts of oil and gas... it did not have big swindlers who 
would plunder the economy." 
 
However, Lukashenka faces the gravest allegations. On the eve of the crisis, 
Alyaksandr Pupeyka, a Belarusian entrepreneur, sought asylum in Poland, 
fleeing charges of nonpayment on a $500,000 credit from a Belarusian bank. He 
brought with him a tale of the president's financial dealings. Mr. Pupeyka alleges 
that Lukashenka earned substantial sums in arms sales and by smuggling liquor 
and cigarettes to Russia from Germany. According to him, Lukashenka's 
"personal account is comparable to the Belarusian national budget, which is 
about $500 million." (Zycie Warszawy, 6 Mar 98; FBIS-EEU-98-071) President 
Lukashenka responded that he would give access to his accounts to anyone who 
wished to see them. "It is hard to believe that, (since I am) hated in the West... I 
would keep my money in foreign banks. If I brought my money to Uneximbank, 
they would hold me by the throat and dictate their conditions.... I do not earn 
enough to store hard currency in foreign banks." (Interfax, 1401 GMT, 17 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-076) 
 
Opposition protests new constitution 
On 15 March the opposition took to the streets of Minsk to commemorate the 
1994 Constitution, which was radically amended in 1996 following President 
Lukashenka's dissolution of the parliament. Over 3,000 persons marched through 
the city, carrying anti-presidential slogans, to the Opera House where a rally was 
held. One speaker, Gennadi Karpenko, former deputy speaker of the parliament, 
urged the leaders of the opposition to "give up their personal ambitions and unite 
in a struggle against the dictator and his regime." (Interfax, 1331 GMT, 15 Mar 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-074) The opposition planned to follow up this rally on 22 
March, which marks the 80th anniversary of the People's Republic of Belarus. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
National unity and Kocharian's candidacy 
The Armenian foreign minister, Vardan Oskanian, told journalists that failing to 
register Robert Kocharian's candidacy for president of Armenian would be 
tantamount to recognizing that Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan 
(Interfax, 1240 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-058). The Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC) has registered Kocharian's candidacy despite the fact that he 
does not hold Armenian citizenship, which is a prerequisite for holding 
presidential office according to the Armenian constitution. Kocharian, a native of 
Nagorno-Karabakh--and hence an Azerbaijani citizen--has served as Armenia's 
prime minister since the Spring of 1997. The CEC was subject to highly 
aggressive "lobbying" on the issue from government representatives. According 
to the foreign minister, the choice was plain: Kocharian is registered and the unity 
of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which was declared in a December 1989 
resolution, is affirmed, or Kocharian is prevented from running and the 1989 
declaration is abrogated. 
 
Predictably, an opposition candidate, Vazgen Manukyan of the National 
Democratic Union, argued the reverse position. It would be wrong in his view to 
abandon the existing policy of pursuing a negotiated solution to the conflict. 
Acting in accordance with the 1989 declaration would be tantamount to 
abandoning the OSCE process. (Noyan Tapan, 1525 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-060) 
 
Since establishing independence, Armenia has neither affirmed unity with 
Karabakh nor recognized the exclave's independence. However, in practice, a 
very high degree of unity between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh has already 
been achieved: They use the same currency, there are no checkpoints or other 
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impediments to travel between them; and members of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
government participate in the sessions of the Armenian Security Council. 
 
Security minister concedes: There are no threats to Karabakh security 
National Security Minister Serzh Sarkisian told journalists that Nagorno-Karabakh 
is experiencing "convenient" conditions at the present time. Alluding to Armenia's 
military alliance with Russia, he stated that war will not be resumed in the region 
for at least two years because a "powerful army guarantees this." Furthermore, 
"[t]he level of Armenian defense is so high that nothing can threaten its security." 
(Interfax, 1656 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-062) In view of the security 
minister's assessment, Armenia's and Karabakh's demands for international 
security guarantees made in the context of the OSCE process seem superfluous. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
UTO deputy leader finally returns to Dushanbe after five-year exile 
On 27 February 1998 Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda, the deputy leader of the United 
Tajik Opposition (UTO), returned to Tajikistan after having spent five years in 
exile in Iran (Interfax, 1545 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-058). Turajonzoda 
had originally been scheduled to return home on 24 February with UTO 
Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri, who had traveled to Iran on a private visit, but his 
return was delayed twice by the Tajik government, at first for unspecified 
"technical reasons" (ITAR-TASS, 2152 GMT, 23 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-054); 
then, the following day, Dushanbe authorities announced that, due to damage 
caused by the recent earthquake, the airport runway would not be able to sustain 
landings by planes over a certain size. Turajonzoda seemed to doubt this 
explanation, stating that Russian transport planes (which were larger than the 
Boeing 727 that had been designated for Turajonzoda's trip home) had been 
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regularly using the Dushanbe airport to fly humanitarian aid to Afghanistan (Voice 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0300 GMT, 26 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-057). 
However, on 27 February Turajonzoda and UTO Chairman Nuri were finally able 
to return to Dushanbe. Shortly after his arrival, Turajonzoda gave a brief news 
conference at which he stated his readiness to assume his post as first deputy 
prime minister and gave an outline of his vision for Tajikistan's future. He openly 
stated his desire to see the revival of Islam in Tajikistan, but once again denied 
any intentions on the part of the UTO to impose an Islamic state. He added that 
he supported the development of a market economy and various forms of private 
ownership. He also favored maintaining close but equal relationships between 
Tajikistan, Russia, Iran, and the other Central Asian republics (ITAR-TASS, 1709 
GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-058). 
 
Turajonzoda also commented on the implementation of the inter-Tajik peace 
process thus far, criticizing its slow progress, and stating that once the terms of 
political protocol of the general peace agreement began to be met and more 
UTO members were integrated into the government, the implementation of the 
military protocol would probably progress more quickly. He strongly favored using 
negotiations to settle recent conflicts between armed groups affiliated with the 
UTO and Tajik government troops, stating that force should be used only as a 
last resort. Finally, Turajonzoda responded to President Rahmonov's demand 
that the UTO clearly state its position on what type of government it envisioned 
for Tajikistan, declaring that the UTO proposed replacing the phrase "secular 
state" in Article 100 of Tajikistan's Constitution with the phrase "people's state." 
However, he also stated that the UTO would not impose such a change 
unilaterally, but that this proposal should be voted on in a republic-wide 
referendum (Interfax, 1545 GMT, 27 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-058). 
 
Approximately two weeks after Turajonzoda's return to Tajikistan, President 
Rahmonov announced the UTO leader's official appointment to the position of 
first deputy prime minister in a decree which he read on Dushanbe's main radio 
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network (Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network, 1000 GMT, 10 Mar 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-069). 
 
Comment 
Although Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's return to Tajikistan is certainly a positive 
development which indicates that the Tajik government has not entirely 
abandoned its dedication to carrying out the terms of the peace process, the 
delays in his arrival and further delay in the official announcement of his 
appointment to the position of first deputy prime minister do not bode particularly 
well for the implementation of the peace agreement's political protocol. President 
Rahmonov has exhibited even greater reluctance over the issue of Turajonzoda's 
return and integration into the transition government than he did over Said 
Abdullo Nuri's return to Tajikistan last August, to assume the chairmanship of the 
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), perhaps because, as Tajikistan's 
former Qozikalon (Muslim spiritual leader of Tajikistan), Turajonzoda still 
commands a considerable popular following. By 25 February a crowd had 
gathered to greet him at the airport, and the Tajik government responded by 
deploying OMON forces to keep a tight rein on the situation. 
 
There has also been some conjecture that the obstacles which the Tajik 
government placed in the way of Turajonzoda's return have been designed to 
splinter the UTO's support base, and to put Nuri at odds with his own troops. At 
least one local UTO military commander had openly declared that his men would 
not disarm and register with the Tajik government until Turajonzoda had returned 
to Tajikistan. President Rahmonov has been pressuring Nuri to issue an 
ultimatum to these troops, complaining that they are violating the terms of the 
peace agreement. Nuri has thus far refused to take such action, opting instead 
for negotiations to resolve conflicts among his own supporters. Both Nuri and 
Turajonzoda have also quite clearly stated that they will not comply with all the 
terms of the peace agreement's military protocol until the Tajik government 
meets more of the terms of the political protocol. One of their main concerns has 
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been the issue of the legalization of all political opposition parties, which has yet 
to be carried out. The opposition parties must be granted full legal status well 
before the elections take place, in order to have sufficient time to organize and 
campaign. President Rahmonov seems to be in no hurry to implement this part of 
the political protocol, however, and until he does, the UTO will most likely keep at 
least a few of its units under arms in order to maintain some leverage. 
 
Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz foreign ministers view threat of Islamic extremism 
On 3 March, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov and Kyrgyz Foreign 
Minister Muratbek Imanaliev met with Tajikistan's Foreign Minister Talbak 
Nazarov in Dushanbe to discuss such issues as the preservation of Tajikistan as 
a secular state and how to combat the problems of drug smuggling and Islamic 
extremism in Central Asia. At a press conference following the meeting, the 
Uzbek foreign minister expressed his concern at Islamic extremist activities 
throughout the region, and particularly in Uzbekistan, and stated that he and his 
two colleagues had agreed to work together to uncover and eradicate the 
sources of this extremism. He also implied that he and his colleagues already 
had knowledge about sources of foreign support for these extremist activities, 
stating that "certain countries support Islamic extremism in Central Asia," but not 
actually naming the countries (Interfax, 1603 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-062). 
The Uzbek foreign minister also met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov to 
discuss matters of regional security. Commenting on his meeting with the 
president, he stressed that "peace and stability in Tajikistan meet the interests of 
Uzbekistan and the entire Central Asian region" and that both he and President 
Rahmonov agreed that the democratic, legal, and secular nature of the Tajik 
state needed to be reinforced (ITAR-TASS, 0631 GMT, 4 March 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-063). 
 
Comment 
Over the course of the past few months, the Uzbek government has been 
expressing a great deal of concern about the existence of foreign-trained and -
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funded Islamic extremist/terrorist groups not only in Central Asia, but also in 
Dagestan. Uzbek authorities have accused Afghanistan and Pakistan of funding 
Wahhabi terrorist activities and have expressed the suspicion that there are 
terrorist training camps on Tajik and Kyrgyz territory. Kyrgyz authorities, while not 
responding to this accusation, have begun to support the Uzbek government's 
claims that there is a serious threat from Islamic terrorist groups (particularly from 
the Wahhabis) located in Tajikistan. Actual evidence of Islamic terrorism in 
Tajikistan or anywhere else in Central Asia has yet to be produced. The Uzbek 
and Kyrgyz governments have arrested persons suspected of being Wahhabi 
sympathizers, but aside from the attack on a Namangan (Uzbekistan) police 
station in early January, which Uzbek authorities have blamed on the Wahhabis, 
there have been no other violent incidents in either Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. 
There are weekly skirmishes between Russian border troops and small groups 
attempting to cross from Afghanistan into Tajikistan, but these usually seem to be 
connected with the arms and narcotics trade, and not with any sort of 
international terrorism. 
 
It is far more likely that the Uzbek and Kyrgyz foreign ministers' visit to Dushanbe 
corresponds to Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's return to Tajikistan, and the Uzbek 
government's concern that his return might lead to the integration of more UTO 
representatives into the Tajik government (in line with the terms of the peace 
agreement's political protocol) and the gradual creation of a more democratic 
political atmosphere in Tajikistan. The Uzbek foreign minister's ostensible 
concern that the secularism and democracy of the current Tajik state are 
threatened seems entirely unfounded--both UTO chairman Said Abdullo Nuri and 
his deputy leader, Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda, have repeatedly stated that they 
have no intention of imposing Islamic law in Tajikistan, and that they support the 
creation of a popular democracy in Tajikistan. At present, the only force which 
seems to threaten the institution of such a popular democracy in Tajikistan is the 
Tajik government itself. President Rahmonov continues to balk at fulfilling the 
terms of the political protocol, including the establishment of a transitional 
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coalition government (with 30 percent of administrative and cabinet positions 
being ceded to UTO representatives), and the legalization of all opposition 
parties. Until these conditions are met and popular elections are held for the Tajik 
parliament and the presidency, there will be no popular democratic government 
in Tajikistan. 
 
Russian border troops in Tajikistan reinforced 
On 9 March, Interfax broadcast a report stating that, due to a substantial increase 
in drug smuggling activities across the Tajik-Afghan border (no figures were 
provided), Russian border troop units had been increased by 400 men in Panj 
(Pyanzh, in the Russian transliteration; it is located in southwestern Tajikistan), 
according to statements made by Commander Pavel' Tarasenko, who is in 
charge of the Russian border troops stationed in Tajikistan. At a news 
conference, Commander Tarasenko stated that the Khorog, Kalaikhumb (both 
located in southeastern Tajikistan, in the Gorno-Badakhshon Oblast'), and 
Moskovskii border units would also be reinforced within coming days. Troop 
reinforcements and additional weapons were to come first from local reserves, 
and if it became evident that these were insufficient, then further troops would be 
transferred to Tajikistan from other areas. Russian Border Service Director 
Nikolai Bordiuzha was expected to arrive in Tajikistan on a working visit at the 
end of March in order to examine the situation along the Tajik-Afghan border and 
to recommend measures on how to increase the effectiveness of the border 
troops' efforts to curb the narcotics trade (Interfax, 1603 GMT, 9 Mar 98; FBIS-
TDD-98-068). 
 
Supreme Court sentences six to death in assassination attempt 
On 12 March, ITAR-TASS reported that the Tajik Supreme Court had handed 
down sentences for the men accused of conspiring to assassinate President 
Rahmonov during his visit to Khujand at the end of last April. Six of the men, 
including Abduhafiz Abdullojonov, the 47-year-old brother of former prime 
minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov (who now heads the National Revival Bloc, a 
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secular opposition party based in Khujand), have been sentenced to death, while 
the remaining fifteen have been sentenced to prison terms of varying length 
(anywhere from one to fourteen years). These sentences cannot be appealed; 
the men's only recourse is to appeal for a presidential pardon (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1155 GMT, 12 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-071). Thus far, there has been no 
public reaction from any of the men's relatives in Khujand. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Militaries criticized from within and without 
The state of Baltic militaries is far from optimal, according to various reports. 
Perhaps the least flattering was the report of Andris Rubins, chairman of the 
Saeima Foreign Affairs Commission. In a meeting with an unnamed aide to the 
US Secretary of Defense, Rubins said, he was told the Latvian Army command 
did not have ideas, brains, or a plan of action. (Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 
11 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-070) 
 
In Estonia criticism is coming from within the ranks of the military, as jurisdictional 
disputes over a joint fleet and over training continue. Four ministries with vessels 
which, under a government plan, would be joined to create one multipurpose 
state fleet, have refused to yield their ships or reach agreement on who should 
run the fleet. The main disagreement over command is between the defense 
ministry and the interior ministry. However, no vessel-owning ministry--not the 
defense ministry with the naval fleet, the interior ministry with its coast guard 
fleet, the transport and communications ministry and its fleet for maritime safety 
tasks, nor the environment ministry with a fleet for environmental monitoring and 
fighting pollution--has agreed to give up any vessels. The issue of creating a joint 
state fleet has been on the government's agenda for two years. (BNS Daily 
Report, 1700 GMT, 4 Mar 98). 
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Even if that debate were to be resolved, the question of training remains, and 
again jurisdiction lies at the crux. According to army chief Major General 
Johannes Kert, officer training is insufficient, and currently the forces face about 
a 50 percent vacancy rate for officer positions. (BNS Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 28 
Feb 98) Training, currently at the National Defense Academy (under the 
jurisdiction of the interior ministry), would improve if placed under the defense 
ministry and made more specialized, he said. Kert and the board of the Estonian 
Reserve Officers Body agree that the present system--with joint training of 
civilian and military personnel--is at issue. In an appeal to the president, prime 
minister, defense minister and defense forces commander, the reserve officers 
requested a separation of training to allow for the introduction of military 
discipline. "In a civil society (...) it is impermissible to impose military order on a 
civilian institution," they said. However, the principal of the National Defense 
Academy, Eduard Raska, recently told the Eesti Paevaleht newspaper that only 
the academy is able to produce well-educated officers. (BNS Daily Report, 1700 
GMT, 7 Mar 98, and BNS, 1400 GMT, 9 Mar 98). Nonetheless, the government 
has decided to set up a single military education establishment that should end 
this particular conflict between the defense ministry and the General Staff. (BNS, 
1900 GMT, 10 Mar 98). 
 
Comment 
Military preparedness must become and remain a focal point if the Baltic states 
wish to keep alive their hopes of ever joining NATO. The countries have been 
hearing comments subtle and blatant for a number of years now about NATO 
concerns regarding the state of their militaries. Several countries, from 
Scandinavia to the US, have provided assistance in training, organization and 
logistics; however, that assistance will only go so far. The Baltic countries need 
to examine critically the status of their militaries in comparison with NATO 
standards, and to work actively toward reaching those standards. Latvia, in 
particular, with an abysmal percentage of its budget going into defense and the 
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military's sad state of health, must begin to heed these increasingly direct 
comments to improve the situation. Estonia, at least, is focusing on improving its 
armed forces, and may have some success once jurisdictional disputes are 
resolved. 
 
LATVIA 
Latvia, Russia cry 'wolf' over rally 
The furor resulting from a forcibly ended rally in front of Riga City Hall has 
calmed somewhat, after signals came from the West that no one was accepting 
polemics from either the Russians or the Latvians about the situation. Both sides 
agree that, on 3 March, nearly 2,000 protesters, primarily Russian-speaking 
pensioners, gathered in the city center to protest increased costs of living and 
decreased standards of living. There is further agreement that one of the city's 
main highways was blocked for approximately one hour, forcing emergency 
vehicles to detour around the city, thereby delaying significantly response times, 
and that the crowd did not respond to requests--first in Latvian and then in 
Russian--to clear the road. Nor does any side dispute that some level of force 
was used by the police to disperse the crowd. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily 
Report, 1700 GMT, 3 Mar 98, and NTV, 1900 GMT, 3 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
063) No one was injured. At issue for over a week, with rhetoric spouted by 
various government officials, was the motivation behind everyone's actions. 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin expressed indignation over the 
demonstration's dispersal, which he termed a "flagrant violation of basic human 
rights." (ITAR-TASS, 1310 GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) In response, the 
Latvian foreign ministry noted its surprise that Russian officials would view the 
situation through a political lens, since the focus should have been on the lack of 
proper permits and the public hazard created by the unauthorized gathering. 
(Radio Riga Network, 1800 GMT, 4 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-063) Russian 
presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky warned of possible economic 
sanctions against Latvia, which he considered would be a just response since--
due to Latvia's reliance on Russian energy supplies--the Baltic state should be 
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"more loyal with regard to Russia's interests." (BNS Daily Report, 1700 GMT, 7 
Mar 98). 
 
Everyone seemed to calm down, however, after a report indicating that the US 
Department of State had no intention of allowing the latest ash in the smoldering 
pile of Russian-Latvian relations to be fanned into a full-fledged flame. According 
to the Baltic News Service, an unnamed State Department official declared that 
the US accepted that the pensioners had a right to demonstrate, yet there was 
no evidence to back up Russian charges of rights violations or Latvian charges of 
Russian provocation. (BNS Daily Report, 1100 GMT, 10 Mar 98). The interests of 
Russia and Latvia would be served best by improving relations between the two 
countries, the official said. 
 
Comment 
While it is way past time for officials in both Latvia and Russia to focus on 
improving relations, thus far few have seemed willing to ignore the temptation to 
slip into what are now comfortable, well-worn roles. Better relations will not result 
from continual scab picking of previous real and imagined injuries, and constant 
repetition of charges of "provocation" and "rights violation" will serve only to 
disengage public interest. Moreover, both countries are frittering away the 
goodwill of the international community in vain attempts to foster sympathy for 
their "trials," especially in light of both sides' apparent unwillingness to cut the 
other country any slack. With both Russia and Latvia putting the worst spin 
possible on every interaction, only the nationalist causes are winning, with 
continued rhetoric spewing forth. What is needed is at least the appearance of a 
willingness to get along, and an end to the polemics. 
 
No double standard of living noted 
The standard of living in Latvia reportedly is decreasing for citizen and non-
citizen alike. A recent poll indicated that most residents would describe the 
country's human rights situation as poor, especially in terms of the elderly, 
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citizenship, education, children, and justice. (BNS Daily Report, 1700 GMT, 26 
Feb 98) Also at issue was the government's rate of response to these issues. 
That perception was validated concerning the situation of children in Latvia. Late 
last year a report published by the Nordic Council had painted a dismal view of 
the life of many children in the country, stating that there were at least 3,000 
children living on the streets of Riga alone, often facing drug abuse and 
prostitution. (Berlingske Tidende, 12 Nov 97; FBIS-WEU-97-232) Government 
officials denied that the situation was as extreme as reported, intimating that the 
motivation behind the reports of nongovernmental agencies may have been a 
search for increased funding. (BNS Daily Report, 1400 GMT, 2 Dec 97) 
However, the government apparently has not been interested in actively 
investigating the situation. The development of a report to the United Nations 
containing an analysis of how Latvia has implemented UN conventions of 
children's rights was promised in April 1997, but the report has not yet arrived. 
(BNS Daily Report, 1400 GMT, 27 Feb 98) Moreover, a recent report by the 
Latvian branch of the Save the Children organization warns of increased child 
involvement in crime, alcoholism and prostitution. In addition, tens of thousands 
of persons, including families with children, are facing eviction over unpaid utility 
bills, the report stated. (BNS Daily Report, 1100 GMT, 4 Mar 98) 
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